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3.1    Introduction  and  Background
It is well known that Korea has sustained remarkably fast catch- up growth 
since the 1960s. Another salient but less well-  noted aspect of the Korean 
economy is its fast demographic transition. Total fertility rate, which was 
5.67 in 1960, has declined very fast to hit alarmingly low level of 1.16 in 2004. 
Meanwhile, death rate measured by the number of death per 1,000 people 
also declined from 13.46 in 1960 to 5.30 in 1995, and roughly remained at 
that level since then. With rapid decline in both fertility and death rates, 
population growth rate and working age population ratio went through 
rapid changes as well.1
From an international perspective, what distinguishes Korea from other 
countries is her fast speed of demographic transition (ﬁ  gures 3.1 through 
3.4). Compared with other countries, various indicators of demographic 
structure such as fertility rate, working-  age population ratio, and popu-
lation growth rate in Korea went through the most dramatic changes since 
the 1960s.2 In the early 1960s, the levels of these demographic indicators 
in Korea and other high-  performing East Asian countries were similar to 
the average levels of Sub-  Saharan African countries. By the early 1990s, 
Chin Hee Hahn is a Senior Research Fellow at the Korea Development Institute. Chang-
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1. Population growth rate registered 3.09 percent in 1960 but has declined since then to 
reach 0.49 percent in 2004. The number of working- age population per dependent population 
(working-  age population ratio) was as low as 1.21 in 1960. After a brief decline, it increased 
continuously to reach 2.6 in 2004. See appendix table 3A.1.
2. Fast demographic transition is not conﬁ  ned to Korean case. The same kind of phenom-
enon is also observed in many high performing Asian countries.94        Chin Hee Hahn and Chang-Gyun Park
however, they were roughly comparable to those of developed countries. 
By contrast, averaged over the whole period, levels of the demographic in-
dicators in Korea and other East Asian countries do not stand out and are 
placed between those of developed and Sub-  Saharan African countries. 
The above observation that Korea and other East Asian countries simulta-
neously experienced fast economic growth and fast speed of demographic 
transition motivates our study.
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Fig. 3.2    Trends of the death rates in major regionsDemographic Transition, Human Capital, and Economic Growth    9 5
broad set of countries. We cast two speciﬁ  c questions. “Is faster speed of 
demographic transition associated with faster growth of per capita income?” 
and “Does faster speed of demographic transition imply faster speed of 
human capital accumulation?” We try to tackle these questions utilizing 
both cross- country data and micro- level household survey data from Korea. 
In cross-  country analysis, ﬁ  rst of all, we suggest several measures of the 
speed of demographic transition of a country. Then we relate these mea-
sures to per capita income growth of countries relying on traditional growth 
Fig. 3.3    Trends of working-  age population ratios in major regions
Fig. 3.4    Trends of population growth rates in major regions96        Chin Hee Hahn and Chang-Gyun Park
regression framework, and to measures of human capital accumulation. 
As a complement to the cross-  country analysis, we also use household sur-
vey data in Korea to examine whether families with fewer children invest 
more on their education. In our opinion, empirical evidence from Korea 
is particularly interesting in that Korea has gone through remarkably fast 
economic growth and, at the same time, remarkably fast changes in demo-
graphic structure.
There are many micro-  level empirical studies on the Beckerian trade-
 o ﬀ between number and quality of children.3 Also, there are many cross-
  country studies relating demographic indicators or demographic structure 
to per capita income growth.4 However, in the case of cross- country studies, 
most of them do not take seriously either the theoretical implications of 
endogenous growth with endogenous fertility choice or the possibility that 
demographic transition is endogenously triggered by the conscious choice 
of between quality and quantity of children.
Meanwhile, some recent endogenous growth theories with endogenous 
fertility choice demonstrate the possible existence of multiple equilibria and 
try to explain the transition from high- fertility no- growth Malthusian equi-
librium to low-  fertility sustained-  growth modern growth equilibrium (e.g., 
Becker, Murphy, and Tamura 1990; Tamura 1996; Lucas 2002). According 
to these theories, the transition from no-  growth equilibrium to sustained 
growth equilibrium is triggered by the rise of return to human capital invest-
ment and the resulting changes in household choice favoring the quality 
over the quantity of children—for example, lower fertility and more invest-
ment on human capital per child.5 In other words, these theories suggest that 
economic growth, human capital accumulation, and demographic transition 
are all simultaneously triggered by changes in fertility pattern stemming 
from increased rate of return to human capital investment. However, to the 
best of our knowledge, it is hard to ﬁ  nd empirical studies which take the 
body of growth literature with endogenous fertility choice as an empirical 
framework to examine the relationship between demographic transition and 
per capita income growth.
Although this study could be regarded as an empirical examination of 
broad implications of the above class of theories, strictly speaking, the spe-
3. Empirical studies employing micro-  level data to test the signiﬁ  cance of quality-  quantity 
trade- oﬀ hypotheses include, among many, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980), Hanushek (1992), 
and Grawe (2005).
4. Examples of cross-  countries on the relationship between demographic indicators and 
economic growth are Romer (1990), Brander and Dowrick (1994), Kelly and Schmidt (1995), 
and Bloom and Williamson (1998). There are also many country-  level studies examining 
demography and economic growth, such as Cutler et al. (1990), Fougere and Merette (1999). 
Meanwhile, there are some cross-  country studies examining the relationship between fertility 
rate and income level. For example, Barro and Sala-  i-  Martin (1995) shows that there exists an 
inverted U relationship between fertility and income level.
5. There could be many factors raising the rate of return to investment in human capital 
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ciﬁ  c questions asked in this study are not explicitly derived from these theo-
ries. That is, the above theoretical models do not have an explicit analysis 
on the relationship between the speed of demographic transition on one 
hand and per capita income growth as well as human capital accumulation 
on the other. Thus, this chapter is a fact ﬁ  nding exercise broadly guided by 
a class of theories, rather than a formal test of existing theories, motivated 
by the casual observation that Korea and other high-  performing countries 
also experienced fast speed of demographic transition.
Our chapter contributes empirically not only to the better understanding 
of the process of economic growth, but also to understanding the nature 
of population aging. It is often suggested that a country experiencing faster 
increase in working- age population ratio is likely to experience faster growth 
of per capita gross domestic product (GDP). This argument seems to be 
based on the presumption that increase in working-  age population ratio 
contributes to growth primarily through increased supply of labor input per 
capita. For example, Bloom and Williamson (1998) argue that much of the 
miraculous per capita income growth of East Asian countries are attribut-
able to the favorable demographic changes in those countries, such as the 
rapid increase in working- age population relative to population. They argue 
that as the East Asian countries are expected to experience rapid population 
aging or a decrease in working-  age population ratio, these countries will 
face signiﬁ  cant slow down in per capita income growth in near future. In 
sum, Bloom and Williamson (1998) suggest that the direction of change in 
working-  age population ratio matters for per capita income growth.
Not denying the possibility that directional change has signiﬁ  cant impli-
cations on economic growth, we suggest that the speed of demographic tran-
sition may matter for economic growth. In this chapter, we suggest several 
measures of the speed of demographic transition, and examine whether 
those measures are systematically related to per capita income growth and 
human capital accumulation.
Finally, by providing empirical evidence on the relationship between 
demographic transition and human capital accumulation, we believe that 
the results from our chapter also help understand the role of human capital 
in economic growth. Despite the important role of human capital as the 
engine of growth as repeatedly pointed out by endogenous growth theories, 
it is also true that it is quite diﬃcult to ﬁ  nd empirical studies documenting 
the importance of human capital in economic development at the compa-
rable level suggested by theoretical studies. In so far as the changes in fertility 
behavior and, hence, the demographic transition are systematically related in 
theory to the human capital investment decision by households, the empiri-
cal relationship between demographic transition and economic growth or 
human capital accumulation could be presented as an indirect evidence on 
the role of human capital in economic growth.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. In the following section, 98        Chin Hee Hahn and Chang-Gyun Park
we brieﬂ  y overview related theoretical studies. Section 3.3 explains the data, 
speciﬁ  cation of the basic regression model, and measurement of the speed of 
demographic transition. Section 3.4 provides our cross-  country regression 
results. We ﬁ  rst provide per capita GDP growth regressions with the speed 
of demographic transition as the key explanatory variable. Then, we exam-
ine whether measures of human capital growth are related to the speed of 
demographic transition. Also, we discuss whether our measures of the speed 
of demographic transition reﬂ  ect indeed the speed of demographic transi-
tion. Section 3.5 provides our empirical results for the household behavior 
on quality- quantity choice, based on micro data of Korea. The ﬁ  nal section 
oﬀers a conclusion of our ﬁ  ndings.
3.2      A Brief Overview of Related Theoretical Studies
Dating back to early pioneering works by Becker (1960), the eﬀort to 
explain child- bearing and fertility pattern as results of deliberate economic 
decision by rational economic agents has a long tradition in economics. 
Especially, the negative correlation between the number (quantity) of chil-
dren and quality of children within a family had long been a well-  noted 
statistical regularity, and several authors had tried to construct theoretical 
models to predict trade- oﬀ between quality and quantity of children within 
a family. It was Becker and Lewis (1973) who ﬁ  rst derived the quantity-
 quality trade- oﬀ under a general setting of utility maximization by a house-
hold without ad hoc assumption to induce quality and quantity trade-  oﬀ.6
Upon repeatedly observing declining fertility along with increasing per 
capita income, researchers had tried to explicitly introduce the Beckerain 
quality- quantity  trade- oﬀ into the growing growth literature. Becker, Mur-
phy, and Tamura (1990) constructed one of the studies that reinterpreted 
the implications of earlier researches on fertility decision and human capital 
investment in the context of economic growth. They developed a dynamic 
general equilibrium model with two steady state development regimes: a 
Malthusian regime with high fertility, no human capital accumulation, and 
no growth; and an economic growth regime with low fertility, high human 
capital investment per child, and positive growth. Although they provided 
an integrated explanation of the fertility behavior, human capital invest-
ment, and divergent economic growth performances, they did not explain 
endogenously how a country starts to make the demographic and economic 
transition from one development regime to another. Tamura (1996) intro-
duces a conditional external eﬀect of human capital in the human capital 
6. The key feature of the model that derives the trade-  oﬀ relationship is the fact that the 
shadow price of children depends on the quality as well as the number of the children in the 
family. The shadow price of children with respect to the number of children is greater the higher 
their quality is. Similarly, the shadow price of children with respect to their quality is greater, 
the greater the number of children.Demographic Transition, Human Capital, and Economic Growth    9 9
investment sector or international knowledge or human capital spillovers 
from the advanced rest of the world and shows the possibility of an endoge-
nous transition from the Malthusian regime to the economic growth regime. 
Tamura (1996) also shows that, among the set of countries that make the 
transition, there is a convergence. Here, the conditional convergence arises 
from the existence of international knowledge spillovers, combined with 
the existence of multiple equilibria. Thus, with ever-  growing world human 
capital stock which raises the rate of return to human capital investment in 
follower countries, one of Tamura’s main propositions is an accelerating 
growth: late transitioners grow faster.7
In line with Tamura’s theory, Lucas (2002) views sustained economic 
growth of countries since the late nineteenth century—that is, industrial-
ization—as a process of diﬀusion of the Western industrial revolution to 
other regions of the world. He further suggests that countries with open 
trading regime and private property right protection went through changes 
in a household’s decision in the direction of favoring quality, rather than 
quantity of children, and experienced both demographic transition and sus-
tained increase in per capita income. Under the perspectives of the theories 
we just discussed, demographic transition, human capital accumulation, and 
sustained per capita income growth could be understood as diﬀerent mani-
festations of one phenomenon, in as much as all are triggered by changes 
in fertility decisions of households in response to the changes in the rate of 
return to human capital investment.
3.3    Data  and  Speciﬁ  cation of Cross-  Country Regressions
3.3.1      Measurement of Speed of Demographic Transition
Construction of the Measure
Our measures of the speed of demographic transition are based on the 
assumption that the speed of demographic transition is ﬁ  xed for a country, 
and are basically the magnitudes of changes in certain demographic indica-
tors during a given time interval. We consider three alternative demographic 
indicators—fertility rate, working-  age population ratio, and population 
growth rate—and, for each of these indicators, construct the measure of 
the speed of demographic transition. Our measure of the speed of demo-
graphic transition is devised to capture how much on average certain demo-
graphic indicator has changed for a country during one unit of time interval. 
  SFERTIL is deﬁ  ned as the estimated coeﬃcient on linear time trend when 
7. As mentioned at introduction, Tamura (1996) does not try to link the speed of demo-
graphic transition to economic growth and human capital accumulation. Nevertheless, as we 
will subsequently discuss, the positive association between the speed of demographic transition 
and per capita income growth is found to be a fairly robust feature of the cross-  country data.100        Chin Hee Hahn and Chang-Gyun Park
fertility rate is regressed on a constant and linear time trend from 1960 to 
2004. SWRATIO and SPOPGR are similarly deﬁ  ned for working age popu-
lation ratio and population growth rate.8
In fact, measuring the speed of demographic transition for a country 
for a given time period is not as obvious a task as it might seem, even with 
the assumption of ﬁ  xed speed. Above all, it is more likely that the demo-
graphic indicators move in a nonlinear pattern rather than change linearly 
over time as we assumed in deriving the second type of measures. It is well 
known that the time proﬁ  le of a country’s working-  age population ratio 
exhibits a nonlinear pattern. During one cycle of a typical demographic 
transition, as exempliﬁ  ed in ﬁ  gure 3.5,9 both working-  age population ratio 
and population growth rate follow roughly inversely U- shaped pattern. The 
working-  age population ratio, for example, mildly declines for a short time 
and then continues to increase with the decline in fertility rate during the 
early stage of a demographic transition. In later stages, it begins to decline 
until it ﬁ  nally levels oﬀ. Therefore, it is possible that the linearity assumption 
produces two diﬀerent estimates for two countries that are experiencing the 
same of speed of demographic transition, depending on which phase of the 
transition each country is located.
Even with these limitations of our measure of demographic transition, we 
chose to maintain the linearity assumption primarily because it is a simple 
and easy way to start. More importantly, as suggested by ﬁ  gure 3.1, even in 
the case of working- age population ratio for which the linearity assumption 
could potentially be most problematic, most countries are located to the left 
half of the inversely U-  shaped curve at least during the period of our anal-
ysis, which seems to make the linearity assumption less problematic.10
Preliminary Analysis
Table 3.1 shows summary statistics of our measure of speed of demo-
graphic transition. First of all, the average estimated speed of change in 
fertility rate in the whole sample is about –  0.06, which means that it took 
about seventeen years on average for fertility rate to decline by one, say, from 
three to two persons per woman. However, we can note that there is a large 
variation across countries in the measure as suggested by the large standard 
8. In an earlier version of this chapter, we also considered a simpler measure of the speed of 
demographic transition, which is the diﬀerence between the time averages of the corresponding 
demographic indicator for the two roughly evenly divided sub-  periods. Speciﬁ  cally, for each 
country, DFERTIL was deﬁ  ned as the diﬀerence in mean fertility rates for the two adjacent 
sub- periods: 1960 to 1984 and 1985 to 2004. The DWRATIO and DPOPGR were deﬁ  ned cor-
respondingly for working- age population ratio and population growth rate. Since the regression 
results using this alternative measure were not qualitatively diﬀerent from tables 3.4 through 
3.6, we do not report them separately here.
9. Figure 3.2 is taken from Bloom and Williamson (1998).
10. In the case of working-  age population ratio, there is also the problem of whether the 
measured speed of change truly reﬂ  ects the speed of demographic transition or the direction 
of change. This issue will be discussed later in the chapter.Demographic Transition, Human Capital, and Economic Growth    1 0 1
deviation (about 0.04). So, the estimated speed of change in fertility rate of 
a country at one standard deviation above the sample mean is about –  0.02, 
which suggests that it takes about ﬁ  fty years for this country to experience 1 
percentage point decline in fertility rate. Next, the average estimated speed of 
change in working- age population ratio deﬁ  ned as the number of working-
 age population per dependent population, is about 0.01, which suggests that 
it takes about one hundred years on average for working-  age population 
ratio to rise, say, from one to two. Again, there is a large variation of this 
measure across countries. Lastly, the average estimated speed of change in 
population growth rate is about –  0.017, which means that it takes about 
sixty years on average for population growth rate to drop by one percentage 
point, say, from 2 percent to 1 percent per annum.
The estimated speed of demographic transition also shows large variation 


















Fig. 3.5    Patterns of demographic indicators in a demographic transition
Source: Bloom and Williamson (1998).102        Chin Hee Hahn and Chang-Gyun Park
across regions. Overall, East Asia and China stand out from other regions in 
all of the three measures. For example, the speed of changes in fertility rate in 
East Asia and China are – 0.09 and – 0.11 respectively, which are about three 
times as large as developed countries or Sub-  Saharan African countries. 
The estimated speed of changes in fertility rate for most other developing 
regions falls in between East Asia and Sub-  Saharan African countries.11 
Table 3.1  Measures of speed of demographic transition: Summary statistics
Region   Mean  
Standard 
deviation   Min   Max   N
A SFERTIL
EASIA –0.09 0.01 –0.12 –0.08 7
SASIA –0.07 0.03 –0.11 –0.01 8
SUBSAHA –0.03 0.04 –0.11 0.04 43
MENA –0.10 0.04 –0.15 –0.03 16
LAMERICA –0.08 0.03 –0.12 –0.02 30
INDUSTRY –0.04 0.02 –0.10 –0.01 23
PACIFIC –0.07 0.03 –0.11 –0.03 10
EURCASIA –0.03 0.01 –0.03 –0.02 3
CHINA –0.11 –0.11 –0.11 1
Total –0.06 0.04 –0.15 0.04 141
B SWRATIO
EASIA 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 7
SASIA 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 8
SUBSAHA 0.000 0.01 –0.01 0.03 43
MENA 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 16
LAMERICA 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 30
INDUSTRY 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 23
PACIFIC 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.06 10
EURCASIA 0.01 0.004 0.00 0.01 3
CHINA 0.03 0.03 0.03 1
Total 0.01 0.01 –0.01 0.06 141
C SPOPGR
EASIA –0.03 0.02 –0.07 0.00 7
SASIA –0.01 0.03 –0.04 0.05 8
SUBSAHA –0.001 0.03 –0.14 0.08 43
MENA –0.04 0.06 –0.22 0.02 16
LAMERICA –0.02 0.02 –0.07 0.01 30
INDUSTRY –0.01 0.01 –0.03 0.01 23
PACIFIC –0.02 0.03 –0.07 0.02 10
EURCASIA –0.03 0.01 –0.04 –0.02 3
CHINA –0.03 –0.03 –0.03 1
Total   –0.02   0.03   –0.22   0.08   141
11. However, MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region experienced somewhat faster 
decline in fertility rate than East Asia and Europe and Central Asia slower decline than Sub-
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Similar phenomenon is observed for the speed of changes in working-  age 
population ratio. It was highest in China followed by East Asia, which are 
fast growers, and lowest in Sub-  Saharan Africa followed by Europe and 
Central Asia and developed countries. The speeds of change in working- age 
population ratio in East Asia and China are also about three times as large 
as developed countries.
Although many, if not most, countries experienced decline in fertility rate, 
increase in working- age population ratio, and decline in population growth 
rate during the sample period we examine, there were some countries that 
do not follow this general pattern. Table 3.2 shows the number of countries 
according to the estimated sign of each measured speed of demographic 
transition. In the case of SFERTIL, negative coeﬃcient values were obtained 
for 133 countries out of 141, among which 128 cases were signiﬁ  cant at the 
1 percent level. There were eight countries where the coeﬃcient was nega-
tive, and ﬁ  ve of them were signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level. Meanwhile, in 
the case of SWRATIO and SPOPGR, thirty-  six and thirty-  four out of 
141 countries, respectively, exhibited negative coeﬃcient most of which are 
signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.
Particularly in the case of working- age population, the existence of nega-
tive coeﬃcients may be problematic especially if these are for mature econo-
mies that have already passed the peak of the inverted U- shaped curve. This 
is so because we are trying to examine whether the speed, rather than the 
direction, of demographic transition matters for growth and, hence, want 
to get a positive estimate of the speed of changes in working-  age popu-
lation ratio for a country located at the declining phase of the inverted 
U-  shaped curve. However, among the thirty-  six countries where negative 
values of SWRATIO were obtained, only one country (Sweden) belongs to 
the developed region, and twenty-  eight countries belongs to Sub-  Saharan 
Africa. Nevertheless, we take this phenomenon into account and consider 
Table 3.2  Sign distributions of measures of speed of demographic transition
   
Number of countries 
with positive coeﬃcient  
Number of countries 
with negative coeﬃcient  
Total number 
of countries
SFERTIL 8 133 141
(3, 2, 0) (128, 0, 1)
SWRATIO 105 36 141
(98, 0, 0) (29, 1, 2)
SPOPGR 34 107 141
    (19, 3, 3)   (81, 4, 4)    
Notes: The speed of demographic transition using, for example, fertility rate (SFERTIL), is 
the slope of the simple regressions of fertility rate on year variable. Numbers in parentheses 
are number of countries that have estimated coeﬃcient signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, 
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alternative measures of the speed of changes in working-  age population 
ratio later in this paper.
As the last preliminary analysis, we present simple correlations of vari-
ous measures of the speed of demographic transition and per capita GDP 
growth of countries for the period from 1960 to 2004. As shown in table 3.3, 
per capita GDP growth of countries are negatively correlated with  SFERTIL 
and positively correlated with SWRATIO at conventional signiﬁ  cance level, 
although it is not signiﬁ  cantly correlated with SPOPGR. Also, there are 
strong correlations among the three measures of speed of demographic tran-
sition. That is, countries under fast demographic transition by one measure, 
SFERTIL for example, also exhibit fast demographic transition by other 
measures, such as SWRATIO and SPOPGR. The existence of strong cor-
relations among these variables suggests that these variables indeed are likely 
to be three diﬀerent ways to measure the speed of demographic transition of 
a country. One can also infer that it is useful to take into account all three of 
these variables in examining the relationship between demographic transi-
tion and per capita GDP growth.
3.3.2    Speciﬁ  cation of the Empirical Models and Data
Equipped with three diﬀerent measures of speed of demographic transi-
tion, we are now ready to embark on examining the hypotheses presented 
in previous section.
In testing the ﬁ  rst hypothesis on the positive relationship between eco-
nomic growth and speed of demographic transition, we follow the typical 
strategy found in empirical growth literature; that is, including the key vari-
able of interest as an additional explanatory variable into a reduced-  form 
“standard” growth regression speciﬁ  cation and testing the statistical validity 
of the variable of interest:
GIi    DT i     Xi   εi,
Table 3.3  Correlations between speed of demographic transition and per capita 
GDP growth
    GRGDPL  SFERTIL  SWRATIO  SPOPGR
GRGDPL 1.00 –0.22 0.45 –0.01
(0.0000) (0.0078) (0.0001) (0.9247)
SFERTIL –0.22 1.00 –0.64 0.61
(0.0078) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
SWRATIO 0.45 –0.64 1.00 –0.54
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
SPOPGR –0.01 0.61 –0.54 1.00
    (0.9247)   (0.0001)   (0.0001)   (0.0000)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are p- values. Measures of speed of demographic transition are 
for the period from 1960 to 2004. The GRGDPL is annual average real per capita GDP growth 
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where GIi is country i’s growth rate of per capita GDP and DT i is the variable 
of key interest in our study and represents one of the measures of speed of 
demographic transition deﬁ  ned earlier. The vector of usual suspect vari-
ables recognized as having certain explanatory power as the determinants 
of economic growth is Xi.
In this chapter, we consider three speciﬁ  cations as the standard regression 
models: two of them suggested by Levine and Renelt (1992), and one with 
additional explanatory variables taking subsequent development in litera-
ture into account. Then we examine whether our measure of demographic 
transition has additional explanatory power.12 The ﬁ  rst regression from 
Levine and Renelt (1992) includes—as explanatory variables—initial real 
GDP per capita in 1960, investment share of GDP, initial secondary school 
enrollment rate and the average annual rate of population growth. The sec-
ond regression from Levine and Renelt (1992) has almost equivalent struc-
ture to Barro (1991), which, in addition to the ﬁ  rst speciﬁ  cation, includes 
primary school enrolment rate, average rate of government consumption 
expenditure to GDP, a dummy variable for socialist economic systems, 
indicators for revolutions and coups, and dummy variables for countries 
in Latin America and Sub-  Saharan Africa. The third regression includes, 
in addition to the explanatory variables in the second regression, institu-
tional quality, openness, natural resource abundance, and terms of trade 
growth.
To test the second hypothesis that relates speed of demographic tran-
sition to human capital accumulation, we examine the simple correlation 
between various measures of speed of demographic transition and measures 
of changes in human capital investment by estimating simple regression 
model.
The data sources for this chapter are as follows. We use real GDP per 
capita (RGDPL) from Penn World Table (PWT) 6.2 to measure growth rate 
of per capita GDP for each country. Fertility rate, death rate, population 
growth rate, and working-  age population ratio are taken from the World 
Development Indicator (WDI) (World Bank 2006). The control variables in 
the ﬁ  rst and the second regression equations are from the data set provided 
by Levine and Renelt (1992). The data sources for other control variables 
are as follows. Openness—the average years a country is open between 1950 
and 1990—and natural resource abundance, the share of primary product 
exports in GDP in 1970, are from Sachs and Warner (1995). Institutional 
quality is from Knack and Keefer (1995). Terms of trade is the average terms 
of trade growth rate between 1960 and 1990 from Barro and Lee (1994).
In regressions of human capital accumulation, human capital investment 
is measured with years of schooling. Barro and Lee (2000) provide esti-
mates of the number of years of schooling achieved by the average person 
at various levels and at all levels of schooling combined. We use total years 
of schooling (TYR), primary years of schooling (PYR), secondary years of 
12. These are the regression equations (i) and (ii) in table 5 from Levine and Renelt (1992).106        Chin Hee Hahn and Chang-Gyun Park
schooling (SYR), and years of higher schooling (HYR) for population aged 
twenty- ﬁ  ve years or above from Barro and Lee’s data set.
We tried to construct as large a sample of countries as possible for which 
the data on real GDP and several key demographic indicators are available. 
Our sample consists of 141 countries.13
3.4    Cross-  Country  Regression  Results
3.4.1      Per Capita GDP Growth
Tables 3.4–  3.6 show our cross-  country regressions of per capita GDP 
growth with measures of speed of demographic transition as the explana-
tory variables of main interest. We use ordinary least squares (OLS), as well 
as the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation technique to 
address the endogeneity problem that might exist in measures of speed of 
demographic transition. Along with all explanatory variables in the origi-
nal regressions except for the speed measure, we include as the instruments 
measures of human capital of a country relative to the frontier country 
in 1960, TYR of each country divided by total years of schooling of the 
frontier country (the United States) in 1960, and the diﬀerence between 
average educational attainment of a country and that of the United States 
in 1960.14 Other instruments included are working- age population ration in 
1960, fertility rate in 1960, population growth rate in 1960, life expectancy 
at birth in 1960, and female labor participation rate in 1960, which are avail-
able from WDI.15
Overall, the regression results strongly support our ﬁ  rst hypothesis that 
faster speed of demographic transition is associated with faster growth of 
per capita GDP.16 The comparison between OLS and GMM results tells us 
13. However, the number of observations in the regressions below can be smaller than 141 due 
to missing values for some of the variables. For more detailed description of the construction 
of our sample countries, see appendix A.
14. We calculated average educational attainment of a country simply as the sum of edu-
cational attainment of population aged twenty-  ﬁ  ve or above at six levels of schooling from 
Barro and Lee (2000)—primary school attained, primary school completed, secondary school 
attained, secondary school completed, higher school attained, and higher school completed.
15. The way we choose instruments for the measure of speed of demographic transition re-
ﬂ  ects the diﬃculty of ﬁ  nding “smart” instruments. One possible justiﬁ  cation for the strategy 
adopted in the chapter is that those initial values, especially the initial human capital stock, 
are likely to be correlated with the speed measure but not with the error term in the regression 
equation. Another justiﬁ  cation is purely a statistical one. It is not unusual to include all lagged 
variables as instruments in GMM estimation if we have a time series data set. Surely, one should 
worry about the problems associated with weak instruments. However, we ended up with fairly 
accurate GMM estimates. We believe that not too much concern on weak instruments is called 
for in interpreting the estimation result.
16. Taking logarithms of our measures of speed of demographic transition hardly aﬀected 
the results qualitatively. In the case of the speed of changes in fertility rate, we considered 
an alternative measure—the number of years it takes for fertility rate to decline from ﬁ  ve to 
replacement level (about two)—and observed qualitatively similar results, which we do not 
report here.Demographic Transition, Human Capital, and Economic Growth    1 0 7
that endogeneity issue may not be a major concern at least in our speciﬁ  -
cations.17
Most of all, table 3.4 shows that estimated coeﬃcients on SFERTIL are 
mostly negative and highly signiﬁ  cant, suggesting that countries with rapidly 
declining fertility rate experienced higher growth rate of per capita income. 
The result is robust to the inclusion of some of the conventional determi-
nants of growth. Next, SWRATIO also enters the regressions with positive 
and highly signiﬁ  cant coeﬃcients, suggesting that countries with rapidly 
changing working- age population ratio exhibited faster growth (table 3.5).18 
Table 3.6 shows that the estimated coeﬃcient on SPOPGR is also negative, 
as expected, although it lost signiﬁ  cance with the inclusion of additional 
controls.
Thus, as discussed in section 3.2, the regression results are broadly consis-
tent with the implications of several growth theories with endogenous fertil-
ity choice. Also, the fact that we could obtain qualitatively similar results 
using all three alternative measures of the speed of demographic transition 
is strongly supportive of our ﬁ  rst hypothesis.
3.4.2      Human Capital Accumulation: Growth of Years in Schooling
Now, we turn to our second hypothesis: the faster the speed of demo-
graphic transition of a country, the faster the speed of its human capital 
accumulation. So, we ran simple regressions with the speed of accumulation 
of human capital as dependent variable and our measure of speed of demo-
graphic transition as independent variable. As the measure of the speed of 
human capital accumulation, we use each country’s annualized diﬀerence in 
years of schooling for the period from 1960 to 2000. Table 3.7 shows twelve 
regression results. The ﬁ  rst row of the table shows the four dependent vari-
ables—annualized diﬀerences in TYR, PYR, SYR, and HYR—and the ﬁ  rst 
column shows three measures of the speed of demographic transition.
The regression results are fairly strongly supportive of our hypothesis 
that a country experiencing fast demographic transition also experiences 
fast accumulation of human capital. That is, all three measures of the speed 
of demographic transition successfully explain variations of annualized 
diﬀerences in TYR and PYR. Speciﬁ  cally, the coeﬃcients of SFERTIL are 
signiﬁ  cantly negative in regressions of (annualized diﬀerences in) TYR and 
PYR. Although insigniﬁ  cant in regressions of SYR and HYR, they are still 
estimated to be negative. Both SWRATIO and SPOPGR, respectively, enter 
the four regressions signiﬁ  cantly with positive coeﬃcients. So, countries with 
faster changes in working-  age population ratio or faster decline in popu-
lation growth rate also experienced faster increase in years of schooling at 
all levels.
17. According to the J- statistic reported in the last row of table 3.4, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of overidentifying restrictions.
18. In section 3.4.3, we discuss whether the speed of change or the direction of change in 
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In order to see whether the regression results reﬂ  ect cross-  regional dif-
ferences, rather than cross-  country diﬀerences, we also ran the same re-
gressions with the inclusion of dummy variables for Latin America and Sub-
 Saharan Africa (not reported). However, the regressions results with the two 
region dummy variables were not much diﬀerent from the simple regres-
sion results above, except that the coeﬃcients of SWRATIO and SPOPGR 
became insigniﬁ  cant in HYR regressions.19
3.4.3      Speed of Change Versus Direction of Change
Up to now, we have tried to come up with various measures of the speed of 
demographic transition of a country and provided empirical evidence sug-
gesting that a country with faster speed of demographic transition experi-
enced not only faster growth of GDP per capita but also faster accumulation 
of human capital. In the case of working- age population ratio, for example, 
it was shown above that a country with faster changes in working- age popu-
lation ratio not only grew faster but also accumulated human capital more 
rapidly.
However, one could raise the question whether our measure of speed of 
demographic transition reﬂ  ect indeed the speed of change, not the direction 
of change. For example, do the positive coeﬃcients on SWRATIO in regres-
sions of per capita GDP growth and human capital accumulation capture 
the eﬀect of “the speed of demographic transition” or “the increase” in 
19. Meanwhile, the dummy variables for Latin America and Sub-  Saharan Africa were sig-
niﬁ  cant in many cases. We do not report the results of these regressions to save the space. The 
regression results are available upon request.
Table 3.7  Regressions of human capital accumulation
    TYR   PYR   SYR   HYR
SFERTIL –0.373∗∗∗ –0.291∗∗∗ –0.080 –0.014
(–4.78) (–6.15) (–1.50) (–0.91)
[0.18] [0.27] [0.01] [–0.001]
SPOPGR –0.421∗∗∗ –0.158∗∗ –0.228∗∗∗ –0.049∗∗∗
(–3.89) (–2.18) (–3.37) (–2.38)
[0.13] [0.04] [0.09] [0.04]
SWRATIO 1.563∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗ 0.919∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗
(5.57) (2.44) (5.25) (3.70)
    [0.23]   [0.02]   [0.21]   [0.11]
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-  statistics and numbers in bracket are Adjusted R2. The 
number of observations is 100.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.Demographic Transition, Human Capital, and Economic Growth    1 1 5
working-  age population relative to population? As noted in our introduc-
tion, there does exists a view holding that a signiﬁ  cant part of the miraculous 
growth of East Asian countries are due to rapid increase in working-  age 
population (labor supply) relative to population (Bloom and Williamson 
1998). Although assessing the validity of the above view is not a main objec-
tive of this chapter, we think this issue needs further examination regarding 
interpretation of our empirical results.
Thus, we tried to perform additional regressions which, we hope, can shed 
light on this issue, focusing on the speed of changes in working- age popula-
tion ratio for which interpretation of our results could be most controversial. 
In the previous regressions, we tried to relate per capita GDP growth from 
1960 to 2004 to measured speed of change in working-  age population ratio 
for the same period. However, the existence of contemporaneous positive 
relationship between per capita GDP growth and speed of changes could be 
compatible with both views: speed of change and direction of change.
So, ﬁ  rstly, we ran again previous regressions with some modiﬁ  cation of 
the time period in such a way that there is no overlap of time periods for 
which dependent variables and measures of speed of demographic transi-
tion are constructed. Speciﬁ  cally, in this subsection, the speed of changes in 
working- age population ratio is measured for the period from 1960 to 1980, 
and the per capita GDP growth rate and human capital accumulation are 
measured for the period from 1980 to 2004. The idea is to cut the channel 
where the changes in working-  age population ratio aﬀect per capita GDP 
growth by increasing per capita labor supply, and see whether our main 
results are preserved. Secondly, we ran regressions with SWRATIO replaced 
by absolute value of SWRATIO. Given the existence thirty-  six countries 
with the estimated values of SWRATIO as negative, this procedure will 
reduce the direction nature of the measure.
The ﬁ  rst column of table 3.8 is the reproduction of regression (3)(OLS) 
of table 3.5, the second column is the regression result with the overlap 
of time periods minimized, and the third column is the regression results 
which is the same as the ﬁ  rst column except that SWRATIO is replaced with 
absolute value of SWRATIO. The table shows that our main results are still 
preserved in these additional regressions. That is, column (2) shows that the 
speed of changes in working- age population ratio is still strongly correlated 
with growth of per capita GDP in subsequent nonoverlapping period, and 
the size of the coeﬃcient became even larger. Also, the absolute value of 
SWRATIO performed equally well. Thus, our main regression results seem 
to capture the relationship between the speed of demographic transition 
and growth.20
20. As mentioned already, the fact that all three measures of speed of demographic transition 
are signiﬁ  cantly related with growth is also conducive to our proposition.116        Chin Hee Hahn and Chang-Gyun Park
3.5      Quality-  Quantity Choice in Korea: Evidence from Household Survey
In the previous section, we have shown that change in demographic struc-
ture is closely related to both human capital accumulation and economic 
growth. As already discussed in section 3.2 in detail, the main factor that 
derives the linkage between demographic structure and economic perfor-
mance is the decision by households facing trade-  oﬀ between quality and 
quantity of children in response to changing rate of return to human capital. 
Therefore, it seems to be quite an interesting exercise to examine whether 
the quality- quantity trade- oﬀ channel in a household’s fertility and human 
capital investment decisions is actually working at household level.
In this section, we present some evidence that explicit choice between 
quality and quantity of children is deliberately made by Korean households. 
There are already many studies that conﬁ  rm the validity of quality- quantity 
Table 3.8  Per capita GDP growth: Changes in working-  age population ratio
    (1)   (2)   (3)
SWRATIO 72.406∗∗∗ 91.720∗∗∗ 56.996∗∗∗
(4.49) (4.85) (3.06)
Initial GDP per capita –0.270∗∗ –0.278∗∗ –0.296∗∗
(–2.32) (–2.03) (–2.43)
Investment share 2.774 –1.754 1.953
(1.04) (–0.56) (0.67)
Population growth –0.389∗∗ –0.631∗∗∗ –0.257
(–2.00) (–2.75) (–1.27)
Secondary school enrollment –0.126 0.153 0.072
(–0.10) (0.11) (0.06)
Primary school enrollment 1.075 0.796 1.440∗∗
(1.63) (1.02) (2.11)
Government share 2.558 3.378 1.112
(0.81) (0.90) (0.34)
Socialist economy –0.059 –0.032 0.084
(–0.14) (–0.06) (0.18)
Revolution/coups –0.207 0.058 –0.611
(–0.34) (0.08) (–0.97)
Africa dummy –0.849∗∗ –0.440 –1.280∗∗∗
(–2.00) (–0.88) (–3.02)
Latin America dummy –1.011∗∗∗ –1.157∗∗∗ –1.125∗∗∗
(–2.73) (–2.66) (–2.89)
Number of observations 103 102 103
Adjusted R2   0.526   0.446   0.474
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t- statistics.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.Demographic Transition, Human Capital, and Economic Growth    1 1 7
trade- oﬀ hypotheses both in developed and developing countries.21 How-
ever, we believe that it would be very interesting to reexamine the hypotheses 
in Korean context considering the fact that Korea has experienced one of 
the fastest economic growth as well as demographic transition.22
The National Statistical Oﬃce of Korea has been conducting a house-
hold survey on income and expenditure, National Household Survey, since 
1963. The Survey started with the sample of wage earners residing in urban 
areas and later extended the coverage to include both the self- employed and 
nonurban residents. The survey conveys detailed information on both sides 
of cash ﬂ  ow, income and expenditure as well as demographic information 
such as number of children. The Survey consists of ﬁ  ve segments of rotating 
panels that each segment stays at the sample for ﬁ  ve years. Samples from 
the surveys conducted in 1998 and 2007 are used. Since we are interested on 
human capital investment on children, we include households with depen-
dents under age thirty.23
We suggest the following regression speciﬁ  cation;
lave_exi    Ni     Xi   εi,
where lave_exi is the log of per child expenditure on education24 by house-
hold i, Ni is the number of children in household i, and Xi is the vector of 
covariates. We include as explanatory variables average age of children and 
its square, educational achievement of household head and, if any, his or 
her partner measured by the number of schooling years, sex of household 
heads, log of total debt repayment, and log of disposable income. Average 
age of children and its square term are included to account for possible dif-
ferences in educational expenditure by level of schooling. We expect per 
capital educational expenditure to be inverted U-  shaped reﬂ  ecting the fact 
that educational expenditure increases as children advance to higher level 
of schooling at a decreasing rate. Parental educational levels are expected to 
exert positive impacts on average educational expenditure of their children. 
21. See Hanushek (1992) or Grawe (2005), among others.
22. There are some, if not many, studies that examine the hypotheses in Korean context such 
as Lee (2007). We do not claim that our study presents new evidence on the topic but that a new 
regression speciﬁ  cation and an innovative approach to instrumental variables in our study may 
provide more solid empirical evidence supporting quantity-  quality trade-  oﬀ hypotheses.
23. It is generally observed in Korea that children do not leave their parents’ house until they 
graduate college—almost 80 percent of high school graduates go to college in Korea—and 
get a job or get married. For male children, they are typically between twenty- seven and thirty 
years old when they leave their parents’ house. Therefore, expenditures on education appear in 
the cash ﬂ  ow of households with dependents aged younger than, say, thirty.
24. As properly pointed out by one commentator, educational expenditure reported in the 
National Household Survey includes expenditure on education of household member(s) other 
than children, which implies that our dependent variable may be plagued with measurement 
error. However, if the measurement error in dependent variable is not correlated with other 
variables and across observational units, we still obtain a consistent estimator without taking 
further remedial measures.118        Chin Hee Hahn and Chang-Gyun Park
The reason we included the sex of household head as an explanatory vari-
able is that women are known to put more emphasis on children’s education 
than men do in Korea. So, the households headed by women are more likely 
to allocate more resources to children’s education than the ones headed by 
men. Log of total debt repayment deﬁ  ned as the total debt service including 
the principal and interest payments is thought to have negative impact on 
educational expenditure and log of disposable income positive impact.
Negative estimated coeﬃcient on the number of children Ni implies that as 
more children are born, the family responds by reducing the size of resources 
devoted to each child’s education. As long as the price for one unit of educa-
tion quality does not vary across household,25 one can interpret a statistically 
signiﬁ  cant negative estimate of the coeﬃcient on Ni as a supporting evidence 
for quality-  quantity trade-  oﬀ hypothesis. Note that a household’s total 
expenditure on education tot_exi can be decomposed into three diﬀerent 
components: quality of education qi, price for one unit of education quality 
pq, and the number of children Ni:
tot_exi   pq   qi   Ni.
Therefore,
 lave_exi   ln
tot_exi  
Ni    ln(pq   q).
Then,

















A fundamental diﬃculty with the speciﬁ  cation suggested above is that the 
key explanatory variable Ni suﬀers from an econometric problem, endogeni-
ety bias. The key presumption in the theoretical literature that we pay close 
attention to in the chapter is that fertility is the result of deliberate choice 
of a family and decisions on fertility cannot be separated from the ones 
on human capital investment. In other words, the number of children, the 
explanatory variable of our primary concern, is determined jointly with the 
dependent variable, quality of education and hence orthogonality condition 
crucial for the consistency of ordinary least squares estimator cannot be 
maintained. In order to cope with the problem, we need to ﬁ  nd proper instru-
ments required for GMM estimation. Along with all explanatory variables 
in the regression except for Ni, we use two instrumental variables; dummy for 
the sex of the ﬁ  rst child and age diﬀerence between the ﬁ  rst child and mother. 
Some researchers argue that the sex of the ﬁ  rst child is strongly correlated 
with the number of children in the family, especially in East Asian countries 
such as Korea and China where preference for male child is still strong due to 
25. The assumption will hold if households are “price takers” in the market for education.Demographic Transition, Human Capital, and Economic Growth    1 1 9
Confucius tradition (Lee 2007). The family whose ﬁ  rst child happens to be 
male is less likely to have another child than the family with female child as 
the ﬁ  rst child. The other instrument we propose, age diﬀerence between the 
ﬁ  rst child and the mother, could be also strongly correlated with the num-
ber of children in a family. That is, larger age diﬀerence implies that the 
mother got married and then bore the ﬁ  rst child at relatively old age and 
the number of children she eventually delivers is more likely to be small. 
On the other hand, there is no particular reason to believe that the age gap 
between the ﬁ  rst child and the mother is correlated with the average educa-
tional expenditure. It is highly unlikely that a woman postpones marriage 
for the concern on fertility decision.
For comparison’s sake, we report the results of both OLS and GMM in 
table 3.5. The OLS estimate for the coeﬃcient on the number of children 
shows a downward bias compared to GMM estimate. Households with 
higher educational achievement by parents, especially household head and 
Table 3.9  Quality-  quantity trade-  oﬀ: Korean case
      OLS   GMM  
Number of children –0.0237∗ –0.0113∗
(–1.77) (–1.69)
Average age of children 0.3081∗∗∗ 0.2873∗∗
(5.22) (3.21)
Average age of children squared –0.0233∗∗∗ –0.0258∗∗
(–2.33) (–3.01)
Household head’s years of schooling 0.1063∗∗∗ 0.0953∗∗∗
(4.49) (4.03)
Sex of household head –0.1083∗∗ –0.0992∗
(–2.02) (–1.81)
Partner’s years of schooling 0.0523∗∗∗ 0.0456∗∗
(3.53) (2.02)
Debt repayment –0.2001∗∗∗ –0.1692∗∗∗
(–3.00) (–2.99)




Number of observations 3,184 3,184
R2 0.1026 —
  J- Statistic   —   2.56E- 4  
Notes: Dependent variable is log of per-  child expenditure on education. Dummy for the sex 
of the ﬁ  rst and age diﬀerence between the ﬁ  rst two children are used as instruments in GMM 
estimation.The J-  statistic is under the null of non-  overidentifying restrictions, and is distrib-
uted as chi-  squared with the degrees of freedom 2. Numbers in parentheses are t- statistics.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.120        Chin Hee Hahn and Chang-Gyun Park
lower debt burden, show the tendency to spend more on the education of 
each child. Interestingly and as expected, female-  headed households spend 
more on education. The inverted U relationship between average educa-
tional expenditure and children’s average age is also conﬁ  rmed by the result. 
According to the estimates, it seems that average expenditure on education 
increases with increasing rate after children reach age ﬁ  ve. One result that 
cannot be intuitively understood is the relationship between household’s 
income and educational expenditure per child. Households with less income 
show the tendency to spend more on education for each child. Statistically 
signiﬁ  cant negative estimate of the key explanatory variable conﬁ  rms the 
hypothesis that the quality- quantity trade- oﬀ channel is working in fertility 
and human capital investment decisions among Korean households.
3.6      Summary and Concluding Remarks
We provide some empirical evidence both at macro and micro levels for 
possible linkage between demographic transition and long-  term economic 
performance. Our empirical results from cross-  country regressions show 
that countries that experienced faster economic growth also exhibited faster 
speed of demographic transition. It is also found that countries with faster 
speed of demographic transition also exhibited faster accumulation of hu-
man capital. These results are fairly robust to various measures of the speed 
of demographic transition. We also provide an empirical evidence for the 
quality- quantity  trade- oﬀ hypothesis with micro-  level household survey 
data from Korea which experienced both outstanding economic growth 
and one of the fastest speed of demographic change. Our empirical results 
seem broadly consistent with previous theoretical studies, such as Becker, 
Murphy, and Tamura (1990), Tamura (1996), and Lucas (2002), which try 
to explain simultaneously demographic transition, human capital accumula-
tion, economic growth, and convergence. In our view, however, one of our 
main empirical results, the positive association between the speed of demo-
graphic transition and per capita income growth as well as human capital 
accumulation, seems to be a neglected feature of cross- country data set that 
deserves more attention by future theoretical and empirical studies.Demographic Transition, Human Capital, and Economic Growth    1 2 1
Appendix B
Country Sample and Country Names
Among 185 countries which are included in both PWT 6.2 and WDI, we dis-
carded forty-  four countries for which we think there are not enough obser-
vations to measure the speed of demographic transition and growth of GDP 
per capita for the period from 1960 to 2004. To be more speciﬁ  c, there were 
many missing observations for fertility rate for some of the years during 
the sample period. Since measuring the speed of demographic transition is 
important in our chapter, we tried to minimize the possibility that only a few 
observations dictate our measure. Also, mostly for transition economies, real 
GDP variable were not available before the 1990s. Thus, we ﬁ  rst divided our 
sample period into two subperiods—1960 to 1984 and 1985 to 2004—and 
threw away forty-  four countries that had less than ﬁ  ve nonmissing entries 
for real GDP or fertility rate. Table 3A.2 shows the country names of our 
sample by region.
Appendix A















1960 5.67 13.46 54.15 3.09 1.21
1965 4.87 11.24 56.68 2.46 1.15
1970 4.27 9.44 59.93 2.13 1.20
1975 3.32 7.42 63.89 1.93 1.42
1980 2.56 6.38 66.84 1.56 1.64
1985 2.04 6.24 68.65 0.99 1.92
1990 1.77 6.26 70.28 1.15 2.24
1995 1.75 5.30 71.77 1.21 2.46
2000 1.47 5.20 75.86 0.84 2.55
2004   1.16   5.10   77.14   0.49   2.56
Source: World Bank (2006).
Notes: The fertility rate is the number of babies that one woman gives birth to throughout her 
life. The death rate is the number of the deceased per 1,000 people. The working-  age popula-
tion ratio is the reciprocal of dependency ratio, which is the number of working age people 
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Comment  Meng- chun  Liu
Motivation
Most previous articles on the subject argued that the economic growth, 
human capital accumulation, and demographic transition are all triggered 
by changes in fertility pattern. This is because the increase in working-  age 
population ratio contributes to economic growth mainly by the increase in 
the labor supply. However, few empirical studies look at the issue based on 
endogenous economic growth theories with fertility choice based on the 
change in the returns to human capital. In order to bridge the gap, Hahn 
and Park intend to examine the issue with the evidence from cross-  country 
data and Korea household data.
Contributions
As the main question asked by this chapter, will the higher speed of demo-
graphic transition of a country speed up both per capita income growth 
and human capital accumulation? This chapter suggests that the speed of 
demographic transition may matter for economic growth. In general, Hahn 
and Park’s chapter provides some interesting arguments and ideas. I enjoyed 
reading this chapter, and have some comments at the same time.
First of all, similar to the direction of demographic transition, its speed 
has the signiﬁ  cant role in driving economic growth. As argued in the chapter, 
fast demographic transition can speed up the accumulation in human capi-
tal, which enables developing countries to get out of the trap of “Malthu-
sian equilibrium.” Are there any other possible explanations? Suppose that 
the fast increase in working-  age population ratio may enable an economy 
to accumulate physical capital stock soon. There is a higher saving ratio 
because of lower fertility and elder population.
Second, the speeds of change in working-  age population ratio in East 
Asia and China are about three times as large as in developed countries. 
The authors provide the positive perspective on economic growth with high 
speed of democratic transition. However, can an economy with a low fertility 
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